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Abstract 
 
Measuring quality attributes of object-oriented 
designs (e.g. maintainability and performance) has 
been covered by a number of studies. However, these 
studies have not considered security as much as other 
quality attributes. Also, most security studies focus at 
the level of individual program statements. This 
approach makes it hard and expensive to discover and 
fix vulnerabilities caused by design errors. In this 
work, we focus on the security design of an object-
oriented application and define a number of security 
metrics. These metrics allow designers to discover and 
fix security vulnerabilities at an early stage, and help 
compare the security of various alternative designs. In 
particular, we propose seven security metrics to 
measure Data Encapsulation (accessibility) and 
Cohesion (interactions) of a given object-oriented 
class from the point of view of potential information 
flow. 
 
 
Keywords: 
Quality; Security; Metrics; Design Principles; 
Refactoring 
 
1. Introduction 
 
System requirements have been classified into two 
categories: functional and non-functional requirements 
(NFRs) [1]. Security is considered part of a system’s 
non-functional requirements. Such software quality 
attributes include, in addition to security, 
maintainability, performance, reusability, and 
reliability [1]. Most of these attributes have been 
studied and measured extensively. Security 
measurements have been defined to assess security at 
the system level [2] and the level of implementation 
code [3]. However, measuring security at the design 
phase, based on typical design artifacts, has received 
little attention. 
This paper proposes a new set of metrics which are 
capable of assessing the security quality of object-
oriented classes. Previous studies have agreed that 
taking security into account from the early stages of a 
system’s development should have a significant impact 
on decreasing many software vulnerabilities [1] [4]. 
Therefore, we have defined a set of seven security 
metrics that can help programmers assess class designs 
from an information flow perspective. 
The approach taken in this work was to define these 
metrics based on the quality properties specified by 
Bansiya et al. [5]. We have chosen those properties 
which are related to individual object-oriented classes: 
data encapsulation and cohesion. Our proposed metrics 
aim to measure any potential information flow which 
could occur through objects instantiated from these 
classes. However, in order to measure the impact of 
these properties on security, we need annotated class 
diagrams. In our case, we use UMLsec and SPARK’s 
annotations. UMLsec’s annotations identify 
confidential data [6] while SPARK’s annotations 
express the information flow relations between 
methods and attributes of a given class [7], which are 
normally not shown in class designs. Once the metrics’ 
results are identified for a number of alternative 
designs, it is easy to choose the most secure design. 
This can be done by either comparing the overall 
results or by choosing the results which satisfy a 
certain security design principle. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
Most current studies on software security admit that 
there is no such thing as a completely secure program, 
but there are nevertheless various ways of reducing 
security risks and vulnerabilities [8] [9]. One of these 
is the enforcement of security in the implementation. 
Several projects have been conducted to investigate 
information flow through computer program code. This 
has been studied using several approaches, including 
type analysis [10] and data/control-flow analysis [11].  
Another approach is to enforce security at early 
phases of the software development lifecycle such as at 
the design phase. One of the earliest studies in this area 
was the development of software security design 
principles by Saltzer and Schroeder [12]. These 
principles were intended as guidance to help develop 
secure systems, mainly operating systems. 
Bishop’s [13] and McGraw’s [14] texts identified 
several similar security design principles. However, 
these principles were not capable of quantifying the 
security levels of programs. Thus, there is a need for 
security metrics based on these principles to 
objectively measure the security of a given program 
directly from its design artifacts. 
Defining software security metrics is another way of 
reducing program security risks and vulnerabilities. An 
existing approach which is used by programmers to 
assess the level of security of given program code is 
based on the identification of vulnerabilities [15] [9]. A 
study conducted by Chowdhury et al. [3] defined a 
number of security metrics that assess the security of a 
given program based on code inspections. These 
metrics need full implementations of the system to 
assess its security. This approach makes it hard to fix 
security errors at the design time and is expensive in 
terms of time and resources.  
In addition, measuring the security of the system’s 
architecture has been done by Manadhata et al. [2]. 
This study focused on the system’s ‘attack surface’. 
Similarly, a study that defined design metrics which 
measure certain software quality attributes was 
conducted by Bansiya [16]. He identified an approach 
to improve the Quality Model for Object-Oriented 
Design (QMOOD) [5]. The model aims to measure the 
quality of various object-oriented design attributes 
such as reusability, flexibility, and functionality based 
on their relevance to certain quality design properties 
(e.g. abstraction, cohesion, and coupling). Even though 
the study covered most design quality attributes, it did 
not consider security. Since security is a quality 
requirement [1], developing a number of security 
metrics based on the QMOOD quality design 
properties is the best option for designing metrics. 
Defining a set of metrics which evaluates the 
security of a given program based on its design 
artifacts rather than its source code would reduce the 
cost of fixing security design vulnerabilities by 
detecting these vulnerabilities at an early stage. In this 
paper we define seven new security design metrics. 
They can be used to compare different designs for the 
same program and identify the best design for a certain 
security design principle. They do this by identifying 
potential information flow based on analysing the 
software quality properties defined in the QMOOD. 
 
3. Assumptions and Annotations 
 
Our security design metrics are designed to be 
capable of quantifying the security level of a given 
object-oriented class. They are different from typical 
“code complexity” metrics, which measure syntactic 
properties of the code such as the number of variables 
and lines of code. Instead, our metrics measure 
potential information flow properties within a given 
class based on its design. This measurement is a 
comparative one. It can be used to compare various 
alternative designs of the same class with respect to 
their security properties.  
The metrics have been scaled to all fit with the 
range 0 to 1. A low value is desired for each. Their 
results show which alternative designs will increase or 
decrease the security of a given class with regard to a 
specific software security design principle (e.g. Least 
Privilege, Reduce Attack Surface, etc [13] [17]). 
Our metrics at this stage are concerned with the 
properties of individual object-oriented classes. Two 
properties are covered: the accessibility of, and 
interactions within, classes. (Other properties of 
multiple classes, such as inheritance, coupling, and 
extensibility, will be considered in future work.) 
To apply our metrics to a given design, we assume 
that system designers will accurately provide annotated 
UML class diagrams using UMLsec and SPARK’s 
annotations. UMLsec [6] is an extension of the Unified 
Modeling Language which labels objects as ‘critical’ if 
they consist of data which can be of a security risk at 
any point. It also associates a ‘secrecy’ tag with data 
which needs to be kept confidential [6]. Our metrics 
consider classified data as that which is defined as 
“secrecy” in UMLsec.  
On the other hand, SPARK is a programming 
language for security-critical code in which the 
programmer may annotate subroutines with the 
intended data flow between variables and parameters. 
The SPARK compiler then performs a data-flow 
analysis to confirm that the code does indeed have the 
characteristics the programmer intended. SPARK’s 
annotations consist of a “derives from” block which 
explains how the value of a certain variable or return 
value is potentially derived from the value of another 
method parameter or variable [7].  
Some terminology associated with our metrics is 
shown in Table 1. 
  
Table 1. Metrics Terminology  
Term Definition 
Classified 
Attribute 
An attribute which is defined in 
UMLsec as secrecy. 
Instance 
Attribute 
An attribute whose value is stored by 
each instance of a class [18]. 
Class 
Attribute 
An attribute whose value is shared by 
all instances of that class [18]. 
Classified 
Methods 
A method which interacts with at least 
one classified attribute. 
Unclassified 
Method 
A method which doesn’t interact with 
any classified attributes. 
Mutator A method that can set the value of an 
attribute [18]. 
Accessor A method that can return the value of 
an attribute [18]. 
 
4. Security Design Metrics 
 
This section consists of three parts. Part one 
explains the security design principles relevant to our 
metrics and our analysis of these principles. The other 
two parts explain our security design metrics. 
 
4.1 Relevant Security Design Principles 
 
This section describes the security design principles 
covered by our security design metrics. As mentioned 
previously, a number of studies have presented several 
design principles for developing secure systems  
[12] [13] [14]. In our study, we have chosen two 
principles to measure the security of designs from the 
perspective of information flow: least privilege [13] 
and reduce attack surface [17]. 
The principle of least privilege is described as 
“programs and users should run with the least privilege 
to complete their job” [12]. The main advantage of this 
principle is to minimize the interactions among 
privileged programs [12]. To adhere to this principle, 
systems must restrict the privileges of their users to the 
least possible. In a class design, this means the design 
whose methods can do the fewest possible actions is 
the most secure. In our case, a class whose methods 
interact with the fewest possible classified attributes 
would be a secure design with respect to this principle. 
The reduce attack surface principle aims to limit 
access to secret data. Howard [17] has identified 
several techniques to reduce the attack surface size of a 
given system including reducing the amount of running 
code and access to entry points. For our purposes, this 
means a class design should have the fewest possible 
accessible methods each with the fewest number of 
parameters which can affect classified attributes 
needed for necessary tasks. A class which has less 
accessibility to classified methods that interact with as 
few classified attributes as possible would satisfy the 
requirements of the security principle of reducing the 
attack surface. 
 
 4.2 Security Accessibility Metrics 
 
Metrics under this category aim to measure the 
accessibility level of attributes and methods in a 
particular class from an access modifier perspective. 
Access modifiers are associated with each class, 
method, and attribute to control their accessibility [18]. 
These modifiers include: public, protected, and private. 
Maruyama et al. [19] have investigated how 
changes to access modifiers could change the security 
characteristics of a given program. Their work shows 
which refactoring rules could change a class’s 
accessibility level and therefore changes its security 
level. However, this approach doesn’t quantify the 
impact of these changes on the security level of a given 
program. Our accessibility metrics are similar to the 
one used by Bansiya [16] to measure the encapsulation 
property of a class, called the Data Access Metric 
(DAM). DAM is measured as the ratio of the number 
of private (protected) attributes to the total number of 
attributes in a declared class [16].  
Bansiya [16] also included another metric to 
measure the accessibility of methods, called the 
Operation Access Metric (OAM). OAM is defined as 
the ratio of the number of public methods to the total 
number of methods in a class [16].  
Our security accessibility metrics statically measure 
the potential flow of information from an accessibility 
perspective for an individual object-oriented class. 
These metrics only consider attributes and methods 
declared as classified since they are the ones which 
need to be kept secret. We divide these metrics for 
individual classes into three kinds of accessibility: 
instance attributes; class attributes; and methods. 
 
Classified Instance Data Accessibility (CIDA) 
 
This metric measures the direct accessibility of 
classified instance attributes of a particular class. It 
helps to protect the classified internal representations 
of a class, i.e. instance attributes, from direct access. It 
is defined as “The ratio of the number of classified 
instance public attributes to the number of classified 
attributes in a class”. Therefore, it is calculated by 
dividing the number of public classified instance 
attributes in a class to its total number of classified 
attributes. This gives us the ratio of classified instance 
attributes which have direct access from outside the 
class. Higher values indicate higher accessibility to 
these classified attributes and hence a larger ‘attack 
surface’. This means a higher possibility for 
confidential data to be exposed to unauthorized parties. 
Aiming for lower values of this metric adheres to the 
security principle of reducing the attack surface [17]. 
Consider a set of classified attributes in class C as 
   ca	, … , ca and its classified instance public 
attributes as   cipa	, … , cipa such that 
  . Then: 
 
 CIDAC   
||
||
 
 
Classified Class Data Accessibility (CCDA) 
 
This metric measures the direct accessibility of 
classified class attributes of a particular class. (In UML 
class diagrams, class attributes are underlined where 
they are declared.) This metric aims to protect the 
classified internal representations of a class. i.e. class 
attributes, from direct access. It is defined as follows: 
“The ratio of the number of classified class public 
attributes to the number of classified attributes in a 
class”. This metric is calculated by dividing the 
number of public classified class attributes of a given 
class by its total number of classified attributes. The 
result shows the ratio of classified class attributes 
which are directly accessible from outside its class. 
Higher values mean that confidential data of that class 
has a higher chance of being exposed to unauthorized 
parties. This metric contributes towards measuring the 
attack surface size of a given program’s classified class 
attributes. Thus, lower values of this metric enforce the 
security principle of reducing the attack surface [17]. 
Consider a set of classified attributes in class C as 
   ca	, … , ca and the classified class public 
attributes as   ccpa	, … , ccpa such that 
  . Then: 
 
 CCDAC   
||
||
 
 
Classified Operation Accessibility (COA) 
 
This metric is the ratio of the accessibility of public 
classified methods of a particular class. We define it 
as: “The ratio of the number of classified public 
methods to the number of classified methods in a 
class”. It is calculated by dividing the number of 
classified methods which are declared as public in a 
given class by its total number of classified methods. 
This value also indicates the size of the attack surface 
of a given class. It aims to protect the internal 
operations of a class which interact with classified 
attributes from direct access. Lower values of this 
metric would reduce potential information flow of 
classified data which could be caused by calling public 
methods. This metric measures the potential attack 
surface size exposed by classified methods [17]. 
Consider a set of all classified methods in class C as 
  cm	, . . . , cm and the classified public 
methods in that class as    cpm	, . . . , cpm 
such that   . Then: 
 
COAC   
||
||
 
 
4.3 Security Interactions Metrics 
 
Our interactions metrics are defined to measure the 
impact of class interactions between methods and 
attributes on the security of that class. They are defined 
in a way similar to the cohesion metric defined by 
Briand et al. [20]. Their cohesion metric is defined as 
the ratio of the number of methods’ interactions with 
attributes in the program code to the maximum number 
of methods’ interactions with attributes [20]. 
However, our interaction metrics instead measure 
the potential flow of information caused by methods’ 
and attributes’ interactions in a given class. We classify 
methods of a class for these metrics as follows: 
Classified Mutators (setters/writers/constructors); 
Classified Accessors (getters/readers); or Unclassified 
methods. These metrics are divided into four parts: the 
interactions of mutators with classified attributes; the 
interactions of accessors with classified attributes; the 
weight of classified attributes interactions; and the 
weight of classified methods. 
 
Classified Mutator Attribute Interactions (CMAI) 
 
This metric measures the interactions of mutators 
with classified attributes in a class. We define this 
metric as: “The ratio of the number of mutators which 
may interact with classified attributes to the possible 
maximum number of mutators which could interact 
with classified attributes”. To calculate this metric, we 
first need to find out in how many places in the 
design/program classified attributes could be mutated. 
Then, we divide this number by the total number of 
possible ways of mutating these classified attributes. 
The result is a ratio which can be used indicate the 
potential interactions between mutators and classified 
attributes. Higher interaction means stronger cohesion 
between mutators and classified attributes within a 
given class, and consequently more privileges are 
given to mutators on classified attributes. Conversely, 
lower values indicate weaker cohesion between 
mutators and classified attributes which means a lower 
chance of classified information flow from mutators. 
With regard to the security principles, a lower value 
allows fewer privileges over confidential data and 
therefore adheres to the least privilege principle [13]. 
Consider a set of mutator methods in class C as 
 ,   1, . . . , mm and the classified attributes 
as ! , "  1, . . . , ca. Let  #$!% be the number of 
mutator methods which may access classified 
attribute ! . Then, CMAI for mutator methods for 
class C can be expressed as follows: 
 
CMAIC   
∑  #()!*	 !
|| + ||
 
 
Classified Accessor Attribute Interactions (CAAI) 
 
This metric measures the interactions of accessors 
with classified attributes in a class. We define this 
metric as: “The ratio of the number of accessors which 
may interact with classified attributes to the possible 
maximum number of accessors which could have 
access to classified attributes”. This metric is 
calculated in a similar way to the CMAI metric by first 
finding out in how many parts of the design/program 
classified attributes could be accessed. Then, this 
number is divided by the total number of possible ways 
of accessing these classified attributes. This results in a 
ratio which directly shows the potential interactions 
between accessors and classified attributes. Higher 
interaction means stronger cohesion between accessors 
and classified attributes within a given class. Similar to 
mutators, weak cohesion is desirable to reduce any 
potential flow of classified data caused by accessors. 
Weak cohesion also indicates fewer privileges are 
given to accessors over classified attributes. This 
would reduce the chance of potential flow of classified 
data to adversaries. Moreover, lowering the value of 
this metric would lower privileges of accessors over 
classified attributes and thus satisfy the security 
principle of least privilege [13]. 
Consider a set of accessor methods in class C as 
 ,   1, . . . , am and classified attributes as 
! , "  1, . . . , ca. Let  ,$!%  be the number of 
accessor methods which may access attribute ! . 
Then, CAAI for class C can be calculated as: 
 
CAAIC   
∑  ,()!*	 !
|| + ||
 
 
Classified Attributes Interaction Weight (CAIW) 
 
This metric is defined to measure the interactions 
with classified attributes by all methods of a given 
class. We define this metric as: “The ratio of the 
number of all methods which may interact with 
classified attributes to the total number of all methods 
which could have access to all attributes”. This metric 
is calculated by finding the number of methods of a 
given class which may interact with classified 
attributes, and dividing this number by the total 
number of potential interactions with all attributes in 
that class. The importance of this metric is that it 
shows how many potential class interactions are 
dependent on classified attributes.  
This is another metric which measures the 
privileges of class methods over classified data. 
However, this metric differs from the previous ones as 
it shows the overall privileges by a class’ methods over 
classified attributes. The higher the value of this metric 
for a given class the more privileges are given to this 
class’ methods over classified attributes, and therefore 
the less that class adheres to the security principle of 
least privilege [13]. 
Consider a set of attributes in class C as  ,  
1, . . . , a and a set of classified attributes as ! , " 
1, . . . , ca. Let  -$!% be the number of methods 
which may access classified attribute ! . Let 
 . be the number of methods which may access 
attribute  . Then, CAIW can be computed as: 
 
CAIWC   
∑  -()!*	 !
∑  .)*	 
 
 
Classified Methods Weight (CMW) 
 
This metric is defined to measure the weight of 
methods in a class which potentially interact with any 
classified attributes in a particular class. We define this 
metric as: “The ratio of the number of classified 
methods to the total number of methods in a given 
class”. From this definition, we can calculate this 
metric by initially summing the number of methods 
which may interact in any form with classified 
attributes in a class. Then, we divide this number by 
the total number of methods in that class. This metric 
can directly measure the attack surface size of a given 
class based on its operations over confidential data. 
This differs from our previous attack surface metrics as 
it doesn’t focus on accessibility but instead it focuses 
on the interaction weight of classified methods. Higher 
values of this metric indicate more classified 
operations are offered by the given class. This leads to 
a higher chance of information flow of classified data 
by calling the class’s methods and violations of the 
security principle of reducing the attack surface [17]. 
Consider a set of methods in a class C as  
m	, … , m and the classified methods as   
cm	, … , cm such that   . Then, CMW is 
expressed as: 
 
CMWC   
||
||
 
 
5. Metrics Case Study 
 
The following case study illustrates how our 
software security design metrics are used. They can be 
applied once a UML class diagram of a single class is 
constructed. This class diagram must include UMLsec 
and SPARK’s annotations in addition to the standard 
elements of a UML class diagram.  
The case study consists of class diagrams of an 
original design and several refactored versions of the 
class and the metrics results. There are a number of 
assumptions associated with these metrics: 
• Any method that changes the value of an attribute 
is a mutator. 
• Any method that returns the value of an attribute is 
an accessor. 
• A method can be both a mutator and an accessor. 
• Constructors are considered to be a special type of 
mutator if they can set any attributes. 
• Some object oriented languages allow methods to 
have parameters which return values (such as “out 
parameters” in C#); we consider these methods as 
accessors. 
 
5.1 UML Class Diagrams 
 
The class diagrams in this section show various 
designs of a single class of a given system. The 
ContactNos class is responsible for storing information 
about a person’s contact numbers. Its attributes consist 
of a person’s name, phone area code, and phone 
extension number which is also their office number. Its 
operations are responsible for mutating and accessing 
these details once they have been requested. Details of 
a person’s office number, and hence their area code, 
are meant to be kept secret. 
To illustrate the capabilities of our metrics, we 
apply them to seven refactored versions of the 
ContactNos design. We assume that Figure 1 shows 
the original ContactNos UML class diagram. Figures 2 
to 7 show refactored versions of the original design 
using one or more the refactoring methods defined by 
Fowler [21]. (We are aware that the original design can 
be refactored into a design which consists of more than 
one class. As mentioned previously, we are only 
considering refactoring designs for single classes in 
this paper).  
For instance, Figure 2 shows a design which has 
been constructed after applying a number of 
refactoring steps to the original design. It can be seen 
that ContactNos’s attributes are declared private unlike 
Figure 1 in which they were public. This is done by 
using the Encapsulate Field refactoring rule. Another 
change is the introduction of a mutator which mutates a 
person’s contact details and an accessor which returns 
a person’s contact details. This has been done by using 
a refactoring rule called Inline Method which combines 
the outputs of more than one method into one. Figure 2 
keeps the rest of the methods in Figure 1 unchanged 
except for declaring them as private. 
Another design is Figure 3 which has the same 
changes as in Figure 2. In addition, it has changed the 
parameter type of the class’s mutators to integers. This 
change, consequently, has led to the introduction of a 
new method ParseIntToString which is neither a 
mutator nor an accessor. This method’s job is to parse 
integers to strings in order to be compatible with the 
class’s attributes type.  
Figure 4 shows a design which is similar to Figure 3 
except it has used the refactoring rule Extract Method. 
Extract Method has been applied to the mutators and 
accessors of areaCode and officeNo attributes. This 
was done to mutate and access their values separately 
while making their methods private.  
Figure 5 has declared the class’s attributes as 
private by using the refactoring rule Encapsulate Field. 
It has also used the refactoring rule Inline Method 
when compared to the original class design. This step 
has led to introducing just one mutator and one 
accessor to set and get the values of all attributes. 
Figure 6 has the same changes as in Figure 5 but has 
also combined both of the telephone number attributes 
to one attribute called teleNo which is declared as 
“secrecy”. This refactoring rule is not shown in the 
literature but we call it “Inline Field”.  
Figure 7 kept the previous changes to the attributes 
but instead it has provided the class with a mutator and 
accessor for each of the two attributes. It can be seen 
from the previous design that the class has kept the 
same capabilities as in the original design. However, 
what differentiates them is how the classes are 
internally structured. Thus, our security design metrics 
are designed to be capable of showing these changes. 
 
5.2 Metrics Results and Representations 
 
Table 2 shows the results of applying our metrics to 
the seven designs shown below. To make it easier to 
understand and compare these results, we also show 
them in radar charts (Figures 8 to 11). This allows us to 
easily compare which aspects of the system are most 
secure and which ones are not. Given that lower values 
 Figure 1. ContactNos 1 class diagram 
 
 
Figure 2. ContactNos 2 class diagram 
 
 
Figure 3. ContactNos 3 class diagram 
 
 
Figure 4. ContactNos 4 class diagram 
 
 
Figure 5. ContactNos 5 class diagram 
 
 
Figure 6. ContactNos 6 class diagram 
 
 
Figure 7. ContactNos 7 class diagram 
 
Table 2. Security Design Metrics Results 
Design CIDA CCDA COA CMAI CAAI CAIW CMW 
ContactNos 1 1 0 1 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.75 
ContactNos 2 0 0 0.33 0.5 0.5 0.67 0.75 
ContactNos 3 0 0 0.33 0.625 0.625 0.67 0.67 
ContactNos 4 0 0 0.33 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.67 
ContactNos 5 0 0 1 1 1 0.67 1 
ContactNos 6 0 0 1 1 1 0.5 1 
ContactNos 7 0 0 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
  
 
 
Figure 8. ContactNos 1 metrics results 
 
 
 
Figure 9. ContactNos 2 versus ContactNos 3 
 
of each metric are considered more secure, designs 
whose charts are closer to the centre are considered 
best. It can be seen that ContactNos 1 from Figure 8 
has the most insecure design with regard to the 
accessibility of classified instance attributes (CIDA) 
while the other designs are equivalent in that measure. 
 
 
Figure 10. ContactNos 4 versus ContactNos 5 
 
 
 
Figure 11. ContactNos 6 versus ContactNos 7 
 
This is due to declaring the classified attributes in the 
ContactNos 1 class diagram as public. However, all 
designs have the same classified class attributes 
accessibility (CCDA) measure since they don’t have 
any classified class attributes. 
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In terms of classified methods accessibility, the 
class diagrams of ContactNos 1, 5, 6, and 7 declare all 
of their classified methods as public which resulted in 
these designs being the most insecure designs for the 
Classified Operation Accessibility (COA) metric. The 
ContactNos 2, 3, 4 class diagrams declare only a third 
of their classified methods as public which resulted in 
these designs being the most secure ones in this case.  
On the other hand, ContactNos 5 and 6 show the 
most insecure designs with regard to the cohesion 
between mutators (CMAI) and accessors (CAAI) with 
classified attributes. This is because the ContactNos 5 
and 6 class diagrams allow their mutators and 
accessors to interact with all of their classified 
attributes. Conversely, ContactNos 1, 2, 4, and 7 allow 
their mutators and accessors to interact with the fewest 
classified attributes, thus these designs are the most 
secure in this regard.  
With regard to the weight of interactions with 
classified attributes (CAIW), the ContactNos 1 and 4 
class diagrams have the highest value of methods’ 
interactions with classified attributes which causes 
these designs to be the most insecure for this metric. 
By contrast, ContactNos 6 and 7 have the least value of 
methods’ interactions with classified attributes which 
makes these designs to be the most secure in this 
respect. 
The dependence of a class on classified methods 
(CMW) is shown to be most secured in the design of 
ContactNos 7 since it has the least number of classified 
methods. ContactNos 5 and 6 are the most insecure 
designs for this metric because they have the highest 
number of classified methods. In fact, all methods in 
ContactNos 5 and 6 are classified which make these 
designs totally dependent on classified methods. 
 
5.3 Metrics Analysis 
 
The simplest way of comparing these designs is to 
look at the radar charts of their designs to decide which 
design is the most secure. The design with the lowest 
values for all metrics is the most secure. This will lead 
us to decide that ContactNos 7’s design is the most 
secure for all aspects except for metric COA.  
However, different systems may have different 
security requirements. Thus, we can interpret the 
results of our metrics with regard to different security 
design principles. These characteristics, in our case, 
will be related to the accessibility and interactions of a 
given design. An example of this approach would be to 
consider the previously mentioned security principles 
in Section 4.1: least privilege and reduce the attack 
surface. Based on the requirements of the least 
privilege principle, the design of ContactNos 7 would 
be the most secure since the metrics of CMAI, CAAI, 
and CAIW have yielded the lowest value. On the other 
hand, from the requirement of reducing the attack 
surface the design of ContactNos 3 would be the most 
secure because the CIDA, CCDA, COA, and CMW 
metrics have yielded the lowest values.  
In general, we conclude that the metrics on the top 
of the charts: CMW, CIDA, CCDA, and COA are the 
ones which mostly contribute to the principle of 
reducing the attack surface. On the other hand, metrics 
at the bottom of the charts: CMAI, CAAI, and CAIW 
are the ones mostly associated with the principle of 
least privilege. 
We can also consider the security metrics from the 
point of view of which refactoring methods are the 
most appropriate to accomplish the requirements of a 
certain security design principle. It can be seen from 
these designs that using the Encapsulate Field and 
Extract Method and Extract Field refactoring rules 
made the designs secure from the perspective of the 
least privilege principle. Conversely, using refactoring 
techniques such as Encapsulate Field and Inline 
Method and Inline Field can satisfy the requirements of 
the principle of reducing the attack surface. 
Of course the most secure design is one which has a 
lower value with regard to all of these security metrics. 
Unfortunately, we usually face a trade off because 
reducing one metric often results in increasing another. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
To develop these metrics, we started by studying the 
rules for writing secure code for a given 
program [9] [22]. We then had to decide how to choose 
which rules are relevant at the design stage. We also 
had to match these programming rules to at least one of 
the software security design principles identified in the 
literature [13]. 
From this we found out that these secure coding 
rules can be basically measured as one or more of the 
object-oriented software design quality properties (e.g. 
encapsulation and cohesion). At first, we tried absolute 
metrics (e.g. the total number of classified attributes in 
a class). However, these were rejected due to the fact 
that they were not capable of comparing the relative 
security level of widely different designs. By instead 
using ratios we made the metrics directly comparable 
even with classes of different sizes.  
The major rule we used to validate the metrics was 
that there must be no two designs which are different 
in terms of their encapsulation and cohesion but yield 
identical results for our security metrics. Different 
designs must have different security levels if their 
differences are relevant to secure coding rules or 
design principles. 
 
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
In this work, we have defined a number of security 
metrics for object-oriented designs. These metrics are 
easy to capture and apply once a given class is 
designed and annotated using UMLsec and SPARK’s 
annotations. The metrics not only allow designers to 
define the most secure design but they can also give 
indications of where any potential vulnerability occurs. 
They differ from code level metrics as they are easier 
to capture and don’t require the software to be 
implemented. We have also shown how to directly 
compare the metrics results for various alternative 
designs and thus help choose the design which best 
satisfies a certain security design principle. The 
defined approach can also make it easier for systems 
designers to choose which refactoring methods to use 
to satisfy a certain security design principle.  
Future work will include a more general analysis of 
which refactoring methods can make certain classes 
more secure than others by making specific changes to 
the design. At the time of writing we are also defining 
another suite of security metrics which cover the entire 
design of a multi-class object-oriented design, 
including coupling, inheritance, and polymorphism. 
 
8. Acknowledgments 
 
We wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their 
suggestions, and Ewan Tempero for his many helpful 
comments on this work.  
Alshammari gratefully acknowledges the Ministry 
of Higher Education in Saudi Arabia for sponsoring his 
PhD studies. Fidge and Corney's contribution to this 
research was funded in part by the Australian Research 
Council and the Defence Signals Directorate through 
ARC-LP grant LP0776344. 
 
9. References 
 
[1] A. Sachitano, R. O. Chapman, and J. A. Hamilton, 
"Security in software architecture: a case study," in 
Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC 
Information Assurance Workshop, 2004, pp. 370-376. 
[2] P. K. Manadhata, K. M. C. Tan, R. A. Maxion, and J. M. 
Wing, "An Approach to Measuring A System's Attack 
Surface," Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 
August 2007. 
[3] I. Chowdhury, B. Chan, and M. Zulkernine, "Security 
metrics for source code structures," in Proceedings of 
the Fourth International Workshop on Software 
Engineering for Secure Systems Leipzig, Germany: 
ACM, 2008. 
[4] E. A. Schneider, "Security architecture-based system 
design," in Proceedings of the 1999 workshop on New 
Security Paradigms Caledon Hills, Ontario, Canada: 
ACM, 2000. 
[5] J. Bansiya and C. G. Davis, "A hierarchical model for 
object-oriented design quality assessment," IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 28, pp. 4-
17, 2002. 
[6] J. Jürjens, Secure Systems Development with UML: 
Springer, 2005. 
[7] J. Barnes, High Integrity Software: The SPARK 
Approach to Safety and Security. London, Great Britain: 
Addison-Wesley, 2003. 
[8] G. McGraw, Software Security: Building Security In. 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Addison-Wesley, 2006. 
[9] M. Howard and D. LeBlanc, Writing Secure Code. 
Redmond, Wash.: Microsoft Press, 2002. 
[10] D. Volpano, G. Smith, and C. Irvine, "A sound type 
system for secure flow analysis," Journal of Computer 
Security, vol. 4, pp. 167-187, January 1996. 
[11] A. Sabelfeld and A. C. Myers, "Language-based 
information-flow security," IEEE Journal on Selected 
Areas in Communications, vol. 21, pp. 5-19, 2003. 
[12] J. H. Saltzer and M. D. Schroeder, "The protection of 
information in operating systems," in Proceedings of the 
IEEE, 1975, pp. 1278-1308. 
[13] M. Bishop, Computer Security: Art and Science. Boston: 
Addison-Wesley, 2003. 
[14] J. Viega and G. McGraw, Building Secure Software: 
How To Avoid Security Problems The Right Way. 
Boston: Addison-Wesley, 2002. 
[15] K. Maruyama, "Secure refactoring: improving the 
security level of existing code," in Proceedings of the 
Second Internation Conference on Software and Data 
Technologies Barcelona, Spain, 2007. 
[16] J. Bansiya, "A Hierarchical Model for Quality 
Assessment of Object-Oriented Designs," Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Alabama in Huntsville, 1997. 
[17] M. Howard, Attack Surface: Mitigate Security Risks by 
Minimizing the Code You Expose to Untrusted Users, 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/magazine/cc163882.aspx [Accessed: 
December 15, 2008] 
[18] C. T. Wu, A comprehensive introduction to object-
oriented programming with Java, 1st ed. Boston, MA: 
McGraw Hill Higher Education, 2008. 
[19] K. Maruyama and K. Tokoda, "Security-Aware 
Refactoring Alerting its Impact on Code 
Vulnerabilities," in 15th Asia-Pacific Software 
Engineering Conference, 2008. APSEC '08. , 2008, pp. 
445-452. 
[20] L. C. Briand, J. W. Daly, and J. Wust, "A unified 
framework for cohesion measurement in object-oriented 
systems," in Proceedings of the Fourth International 
Software Metrics Symposium., 1997, pp. 43-53. 
[21] M. Fowler, Refactoring: Improving The Design Of 
Existing Code. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1999. 
[22] B. Chess and J. West, Secure programming with static 
analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Addison-Wesley, 
2007. 
 
 
 
